Office for Nuclear Regulation

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WESTINGHOUSE AP1000® GENERIC DESIGN ASSESSMENT GDA ISSUE PMS ADEQUACY OF SAFETY CASE GI-AP1000-CI-08 REVISION 0

Technical Area		CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION				
Related Technical Areas		None				
GDA Issue Reference	GI-AP1000-CI-08		GDA Issue Action Reference	GI-AP1000-CI-08.A1		
GDA Issue	for the PMS safety demonstrated requires an 'added quality' desifficult to understand without concerns WEC has produced the platform and application desired areas for improvement includemonstration, and justification building measures. The PMS related Assessment Findings ic and to reflect PMS development For further guidance, see T1 TO2s plus T15.TO2.36 and associated TO2s, and T16.TO		in the provision of a claims - argument - evidence structure ration. The PMS is based on non safety equipment and emonstration to be made; this demonstration has proved a logically structured safety case. In response to our a Basis of Safety Case (BSC) for the PMS covering both evelopment. Review of the BSC has identified a number of uding, to the SAPs and IEC standards conformance of the scope and adequacy of the independent confidence safety case needs to incorporate the responses to the PMS dentified in ONR C&I Assessment Report No. 11/006 (draft) in the progress as the design is completed 15.TO1.02, T15.TO1.03 T15.TO1.11 and their associated T15.TO2.43 in Annex 5, and also T16.TO1.01 and its D1.02, T16.TO2.07, T16.TO2.08, T16.TO2.09, T16.TO2.38 in Annex 6 of ONR C&I Assessment Report No. 11/006			
GDA Issue Action	the basis of safety cas	se to facilitate ONR access in the UK to the detailed evidence used to support safety case for the PMS.				
	With agreement from the Regulator this action may be completed by alternative means.					

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Related Technical Areas		None				
GDA Issue Reference	GI-AP1000-CI-	08	GDA Issue Action Reference	GI-AP1000-CI-08.A2		
GDA Issue Action	Westinghouse to provide a basis of safety case for the PMS that takes into account the expectations expressed below:					
	The BSC should start by identifying the safety principles and standards (i.e. company, national and international) that WEC has adopted for the equipment / system.					
	The BSC should identify the arguments for assigning safety functions and performance requirements to the equipment / system in compliance with the categorisation and classification principles and standards.					
	The BSC demonstration of compliance with SAPs and standards needs to show that the development practices are consistent with modern standards and the declared practices (e.g. in procedures) have been adhered to. Compensatory measures are required to address gaps in the compliance demonstration.					
	to ISO 9001). The	C should describe the equipment / system, and identify the major elements (such ors, input/output and logic cards, and actuators) and include the demonstration of				
		documents referenced from the BSC should address the system including the intended factory and commissioning tests, and dification.				
	The BSC should describe future work related to site construction and commission activities, and identify when the evidence related to these activities will be produced.					
	For completeness, the BSC should also specify through life operating and maintena requirements including the minimum equipment availability requirements, and the sc and frequency of any proof testing.					
	The BSC should identify any supporting analysis such as hazards analysis, FMEA reliability analysis, environmental qualification, and link them to the claims made in t safety demonstration. The BSC should identify the use of defensive design and fa revealing techniques.					
	The BSC should identify the pedigree of any COTS and pre-developed component					

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Related Technical Areas		None					
GDA Issue Reference	GI-AP1000-CI-08		GDA Issue Action Reference	GI-AP1000-CI-08.A2			
	provide a demonstration of the adequacy of the development arrangements. For older components the safety argument might involve use of proven in use arguments and testing rather than a production excellence argument. In either case any compensatory measures undertaken to address shortfalls should be identified in the safety demonstration.						
	The BSC should demonstrate how the design and implementation of the equipment using complex / programmable, components, e.g. microprocessors, ASICs, and Field Programmable Gate Arrays complies with relevant WEC safety principles and standards. Given the programmable nature of such complex devices, SAP ESS.27 a special case procedure for the demonstration of safety that involves the presentation of an argument of production excellence and implementation of independent confidence building measures. Where complex hardware is involved, the BSC should identify how the safety demonstration conforms to ESS.21 and the need for measures such as independent third party assessment.						
	The BSC should include a plan that shows the forward activities, and production of related safety case documentation and evidence. Interim BSCs should be provided, particularly for large complex systems. A BSC for the completed design¹ should be submitted as soon as reasonably practicable before permission to commence nuclear site construction is sought. A BSC for installation and commissioning would be expected before equipment is delivered to site. Notes 1. Completed design – The design is complete at the point where the: • requirements, specifications, and implementation details (e.g. software coding and circuit diagrams etc.) have been completed;						
	 production verbeen complete 	uction verification and validation activities (i.e. prior to delivery to site) have a completed;					
	 prototype equipment has been produced and subject to performance and qualification testing; With agreement from the Regulator this action may be completed by alternative means. 						

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